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In the present study, we applied the quest for significance model of radicalization to explain the use of political
violence. According to the model, when people experience loss of personal significance (e.g., due to social
rejection, achievement failures, or abuse) the motivation to restore significance may push them toward the use
of extreme means. We tested this prediction in a sample of individuals who have committed ideologically
motivated crimes in the United States (n5 1496). We found that experiences of economic and social loss of
significance were separate and positive predictors related to the use of violence by perpetrators of
ideologically motivated crimes. We also found evidence that the presence of radicalized others (friends but not
family members) in the individuals’ social network increased their likelihood of using violence.
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“The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that
their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social condi-
tions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have
nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.” —Manifesto of the Com-
munist Party
History is replete with examples of extreme political violence in the form of social revolutions,
acts of terrorism, and violent protests, in which perpetrators justify their actions by invoking the
socially desired values of justice, equality, or freedom that those acts purportedly serve. It sometimes
seems that the crueler the means, the nobler the ends required for their justification. By some esti-
mates, violence is on the decline in contemporary societies (Pinker, 2012). However, the everyday
occurrence of ideologically motivated brutality, acutely exemplified recently by activities of the self-
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proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS), as well as its appeal, illustrated by thousands of ISIS recruits world-
wide, highlights its destructive potential and the danger it poses to global security (Ligon, Harms, &
Derrick, 2015).
Relatedly, politically motivated violence on domestic targets—so called “homegrown” terrorist
attacks—have received an enormous amount of recent attention in the wake of incidents like the 2011
attacks by far-right extremist Anders Breivik, who killed eight people in Oslo and shot another 69 at a
summer camp in rural Norway (Rykkja, Lægreid, & Fimreite, 2011); the Boston Marathon bombings
of 2013 which killed three and injured more than 260 others (LaFree & Adamczyk, 2016); and the
June 2016 mass shooting in a nightclub in Orlando, Florida that killed 49 and injured many others
(Zezima, Zapotosky, Goldman, & Berman, 2016). Given the seeming spread of such attempts and
their frightening potential, understanding the emergence and persistence of politically motivated vio-
lence presents a particularly important issue for both researchers and policymakers.
In the current article, we apply a social psychological perspective to examine a large sample of
individuals who committed politically motivated crimes in the United States. Specifically, we are
interested in determining the differences between extremists who engaged in ideologically motivated
violence compared to those who were committed to similar goals but engaged only in nonviolent ille-
gal behavior. Our analysis is informed by the quest for significance perspective (Kruglanski, Chen,
Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009; 2014), whereby, assuming the accessibility of a violence-
justifying ideology, the occurrence of violence is expected to be more likely under psychological con-
ditions that induce a search for personal significance and meaning in life. Based on this perspective,
we developed a set of measures of the individual’s loss of significance and the strength of their ties to
social networks committed to violent ideologies. Our analysis additionally controlled for a wide varie-
ty of other variables of apparent relevance to violence.
In the next section, we provide the theoretical background for our hypotheses. We then describe
the data used for the analysis and the methods employed. Because our data set had a good deal of
missing information on individual variables, we describe in some detail the methods we used for
imputing missing values. We subsequently report bivariate findings, followed by multivariate logistic
regression models. Finally, we discuss the conceptual and practical implications of the research.
Frustration of Psychological Needs and Violence
Given that most major religious and philosophical systems prohibit violence except under
limited and very special conditions, the question of why individuals turn to violence has been a central
concern in social psychology for decades. Thus, researchers have postulated links between violence
and the frustration of important psychological needs such as the need to belong (Leary, Twenge, &
Quinlivan, 2006), the need for membership in valued social groups (Fischer, Haslam, & Smith, 2010),
the need for control, certainty, and meaning (Hogg & Adelman, 2013; Kay & Eibach, 2013;
Pyszczynski et al., 2006).
With regard to the need to belong, multiple studies have shown that when participants were
rejected or ostracized by others, they displayed aggression against those others (Buckley, Winkel, &
Leary, 2004; Warburton, Williams, & Cairns, 2006), and even toward third parties not involved in the
original rejection (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Warburton et al., 2006). A growing
body of research has applied these general concepts specifically to those who use terrorist methods.
For example, recent research on individuals who have engaged in lone acts of terrorism has shown
that compared to the general population, those individuals were disproportionately likely to be socially
isolated and divorced, separated, or widowed (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014; Gruenewald, Chermak,
& Freilich, 2013).
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Similarly, there is evidence that when important social identities are threatened, people often
react with aggression and are more likely to support revenge (Fischer et al., 2010). Thus, suicide
bombings against Americans in Iraq were perceived as justified by Jordanian and Lebanese respond-
ents who felt that their countries and their religion were under threat from the United States (Chiozza,
2010) and perceived incompatibility between Arab and American values was the best predictor of
support for fundamentalist violence such as killing of civilians (Sidanius, Kteily, Levin, Pratto, &
Obaidi, 2015). Studies of collective narcissism, a form of insecure ingroup attachment related to feel-
ings that the ingroup has been disrespected, showed that it is positively related to aggressive
intergroup behavior (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). This particular
mechanism was also confirmed in the context of terrorism so that the perception of being the victim
of anti-Muslim discrimination was associated with support for suicide bombing in Muslim diaspora
populations (Victoroff, Adelman, & Matthews, 2012).
Finally, research has demonstrated that when needs for meaning and certainty are threatened
people are more likely to endorse extreme views and behaviors, including attitudes toward violence.
For instance, when people felt uncertain they liked extreme protest groups more (Hogg, Meehan, &
Farquharson, 2010), supported retaliatory aggressive state policies against outgroups (Maoz &
McCauley, 2008), and were more willing to engage in radical social behavior (Hogg & Adelman,
2013). Simply reminding people of their mortality, interpretable as an ultimate frustration of the need
for control and meaning in life, led to aggressive behavior against worldview-threatening others
(McGregor et al., 1998) and increased support for suicide bombing (Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Pyszc-
zynski, Motyl, & Abdollahi, 2009).
Taken together, these results suggest a link between a threat to important human motives (to
belong, control, or understand) and support for and engagement in violent behavior against others,
including support for ideologically motivated violence. However, the same variables that led to
aggressive outcomes in some studies were related to benevolent and peaceful behaviors in others. For
example, Simon, Troetschel, and Daehne (2008) found that when participants were uncertain as to
whether they were accepted by a peace movement with which they were strongly identified, they
donated more money to the cause as compared to when they were certain. A review of the literature
on the consequences of suffering and adverse life events has shown that they may actually enhance
the motivation to help other people, including outgroups, partly because such behavior restores a sense
of meaning in life (Volhardt, 2009). It thus seems clear that the frustration of important social needs
can be related to behaviors on both ends of the aggressive-benevolent spectrum.
Although the current research concentrates on the violent end of this continuum, we adopt a uni-
fying framework that ultimately aims to explain both sets of behaviors. Specifically, we assume that
the common theme across experiences of frustration and disappointment is the motivation to establish
one’s feeling of significance, a sense of meaning and mattering (Kruglanski et al., 2009, 2013, 2014).
Frustration of this need can foster a powerful experience that overshadows alternate pursuits and redi-
rects individual psychological resources to the singular quest for significance. We argue that the stron-
ger the experience of insignificance, the stronger will be the motivation to engage in value-driven
behavior, hence the greater the probability of using extreme means to achieve the goal of increasing
significance. We elaborate on this logic in the next section.
Significance Quest Theory and Value-Driven Extremism
When people perceive themselves as rejected, divested of control, or as victims of injustice, they
feel belittled and disrespected; consequently, they are motivated to restore their sense of self-worth
and meaning. According to the significance quest theory (Kruglanski et al., 2009, 2013, 2014), the
need for personal significance makes the occurrence of extreme behavior more likely. Propelled by
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such needs, people should be more likely to fully commit to important goals and to suppress other
concerns because the former are especially well-suited to restoring their sense of meaning and person-
al significance. As Erich Fromm (1973) expressed it: “Man needs an object of devotion to be the focal
point of all his strivings . . . . It elevates him beyond his isolated existence, with all its doubts and inse-
curity, and gives meaning to life” (p. 260).
As a consequence of commitment to important goals, people should be more likely to use
whatever means they perceive as necessary, regardless of how extreme those means are.
Extreme behavior in the service of a lofty cause reflects considerable investment, because such
behavior is counter normative and very often counter final (Kruglanski, Chernikova, Babush,
Dugas, & Schumpe, 2015). For example, the readiness to kill other human beings for a cause
requires overcoming the killing prohibition stressed by most philosophies and religions, as well
as suppressing one’s own natural empathy for others’ suffering. Such means may be appealing
to individuals for at least two reasons. First, extreme means may be perceived as especially use-
ful for achieving a valued cause, as when fully committed members of terrorist organizations
interpret a violent attack as a more effective way of achieving organizational goals than a peace-
ful protest. Second, it is also possible that extreme means are chosen because they unambigu-
ously communicate a complete commitment to the cause. As research on interpersonal
commitment has repeatedly shown (Le & Agnew, 2003), the greater one’s investment in a given
pursuit, the greater one’s perceived commitment to its underlying purpose. Such clarity is espe-
cially sought by individuals in search of meaning and significance (Webber et al., 2016).
Importance of Radical Social Networks
As noted above, the motivation to restore significance and mattering can result in both pro-
social and antisocial behavior. An important factor that determines the direction of extreme
commitment is the social context in which individuals are embedded. Studies on social influ-
ence consistently show that people strongly care about the opinions of significant others; mem-
bers of major groups to which they belong (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). Radical social networks
can influence the intention to engage in violence through at least two mechanisms. First, radical-
ized others validate the mere idea of using violence as a legitimate means. When people per-
ceive important others to be willing to engage in violent acts, such behaviors are perceived as
less extreme and more normative, which can subsequently decrease objections against violence
and make it easier to deviate from broad societal norms. Empirical research attests to the fact
that when a violent act is socially validated, participants experience less guilt and distress than
when it is questioned by others (Webber, Schimel, Martens, Hayes, & Faucher, 2013). Second,
through intensive interactions others may influence the extremity of values and commitment to
a particular cause, a mechanism demonstrated by research on group polarization (Isenberg,
1986). In support of this process, a study by Thomas, McGarty, and Louis (2014) has shown
that priming extreme political action as a legitimate idea combined with social interaction
increased support for such an action. Neither factor (priming, interaction) alone was sufficient
to evoke the effect. It seems likely that having a network of others supporting extremist views
satisfies both conditions as such a social context may both legitimize and exaggerate the appeal
of radical behavior, including violence.
In the current study, we have a sample of individuals who have demonstrated their commitment
to an extremist ideology and based on the arguments above, we expect that their willingness to use
violence to further their cause will be influenced by the degree of violent radicalization present in their
close social networks.
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The Present Research
We argue that as people strive to find meaning in life and prove their worth to themselves and
others, they will be more likely to engage in extreme, high-investment behaviors in service of impor-
tant values. High among such values are preservation, promotion, and defense of one’s ingroup and
justice and truth. In the course of human history, any and all of these have been known to inspire
extreme behaviors including the willingness to kill or be killed. We suggest that what extreme actions
offer individuals is a restoration of threatened self-significance. As Anders Breivik (2011), the Norwe-
gian extremist who killed more than 70 put it, “I have never in my life felt that I have done anything
more meaningful than what I am doing now” (p. 854).
So far, empirical evidence for the role of loss of significance has concentrated on measures of
attitudinal extremity. For example, a series of field studies conducted with samples of imprisoned
Islamic militants in the Philippines, former militant members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and a group of at-risk Muslim immigrants in southern Spain have demonstrated
a relationship between feelings of shame and humiliation and endorsement of an extreme ideology. In
addition, laboratory experiments conducted with U.S. college students confirmed the causal relation-
ship between these variables (Webber et al., 2016). A study conducted in the context of actual violent
attacks showed that the greater the number of significance quest-inducing circumstances, the greater
the number of victims killed in suicide attacks (Webber et al., in press).
However, to our knowledge, there are no prior studies that directly tested the impact of threats to
esteem and personal significance on the use of violence in a sample of homegrown extremists. In the
present study, we aimed to address this gap. We hypothesize that the greater the intensity of loss of
significance, as indicated by objective measures of economic failure, social detachment, and experi-
ence of trauma and abuse, the higher the chances that radicalized individuals will use violent means to
pursue their ideological goals. As we suggested before, the mere presence of threats to personal signif-
icance does not determine whether individuals will try to regain significance through violent or
prosocial behavior. However, in this study, we examined a sample of individuals who had already
demonstrated their commitment to illegal behavior. Thus, in this particular case, we assumed that
extremity would be indicated by increased violence. Moreover, following the arguments above, we
also measure the strength of ties to radical social networks. We predict that the more radicalized the
social context in which individuals are embedded, the greater the chances that they will engage in vio-
lent extremist action. In investigating these hypotheses, we control for other variables that in the past
have been associated with political extremism.
Methods
Data
Data from this project were drawn from the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the
United States (PIRUS) data, collected and maintained by the START Center (National Center
for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism) at the University of Maryland. The
PIRUS data are based on publicly available court documents, newspaper accounts, and pub-
lished sources on 1,496 individuals drawn generally from three ideological groups: far left, far
right, and radical Islamic.1 We include all individuals who have radicalized within the United
States to the point of committing ideologically motivated illegal violent or nonviolent acts, join-
ing a designated terrorist organization, or associating with an organization whose leader(s) has
1 For a more detailed description of the ideological categories included in the PIRUS database, see Jensen, James, and
Tinsley (2015). The sample also includes a small number of cases that could not be unambiguously placed in one of
these three ideological categories because they were focused on single issues.
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or have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent offense. We define these cases as
“homegrown terrorism” in that the radicalization process must have begun and significantly
advanced within the United States. By “significantly advanced” we mean that most or all of the
individual’s radicalization occurred while they were residing in the United States. If there was
no evidence that the individual ever resided outside of the United States, we assume that the
case is domestic. We also assume that individuals who left the United States to attend training
camps abroad were already radicalized when they made the decision to attend.
All data were collected between July 1, 2013 and June 3, 2014. To check the reliability of the
coding, we took a 10% random sample of cases and coded each case twice using separate individuals.
The research team used Krippendorff’s (2011) alpha procedure to assess the reliability of the coding
procedures which resulted in an alpha score of .76, which is above the common standard for accept-
able reliability (>.70).
Variables in the Model
Violence. Our dependent variable was whether the plot or extremist activity was violent or
nonviolent. Examples of violent behavior included murder, assault, armed robbery, and kidnapping.
Examples of nonviolent behavior included money laundering, providing weapons, and tax fraud in
support of illegal ideologically motivated activities.
We had three groups of predictors: indicators of loss of significance, indicators of a radical social
network, and a set of control variables. The details of the coding scheme for all of the variables are
presented in Table 1.
Loss of significance. We distinguished between variables related to (1) achievement-related loss
of significance, (2) relationship-related loss of significance, and (3) loss of significance related to trau-
matic/abusive experiences. We aimed to provide a conservative test of the theory, according to which
all instances of threatened significance should produce similar effects. We coded all three sets of vari-
ables such that higher values indicated greater loss of significance.
The first set of predictors represented a loss of significance in an achievement domain. To that
end, we used four variables that measured individual economic failure: whether an individual was
unemployed at the moment of the extremist activity (Employment Situation), the regularity of their
work history (Work History), the socioeconomic status of the individual at the moment of the extrem-
ist activity (Social Stratum), and whether they had failed to achieve their aspirations (Aspirations).
The next four variables measured loss of significance in the domain of social relations, as indicat-
ed by difficulties in finding and maintaining romantic relationships (Relationship Troubles), difficul-
ties in finding and maintaining nonromantic relationships (Platonic Troubles), being marginalized or
dismissed from social groups or organizations (Kicked Out), and experiencing a diminution in social
standing (Loss of Social Standing).
Finally, we included three variables that measured the experience of abuse either in childhood or
adulthood (Abused—Childhood, Abused—Adulthood) and a traumatic event that involved intense
fear, helplessness, or horror (Trauma).
All of the variables related to loss of significance with the exception of three (Work History,
Social Stratum, Aspirations) were dichotomous indicating either a presence (coded “1”) or absence
(coded “0”) of a given attribute.
Radical social network. To measure individual’s exposure to a radical social network, we used
three variables, which indicated to what extent a close friend, a family member, and/or a significant
other were involved in radical activities themselves (Radical Friend, Radical Family, Radical Signifi-
cant Other). All three variables were coded on a 4-point scale so that exposure to extremist violent
activity was coded highest (3), nonexposure lowest (0), and exposure to legal activity (1) and to
nonviolent illegal activity (2) intermediate.
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Table 1. Coding and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Coding Distribution N % missing values
Violent No5 0 38% 1496 0%
Yes5 1 62%
Loss of Significance – Achievement
Employment Situation Employed/student/retired5 0 88% 640 57%
Unemployed5 1 12%
Work History Regularly employed5 0 60% 477 68%
Serially employed5 1 25%
Underemployed5 2 5%
Long-term unemployed5 3 10%
Social Stratum High5 0 13% 679 55%
Middle5 1 65%
Low5 2 22%
Aspirations Achieved aspirations5 0 28% 155 90%
Did not have aspirations 51 26%
Did not attempt/failed to achieve5 2 47%
Loss of Significance – Social Relations
Relationship Troubles No5 0 78% 352 76%
Yes5 1 22%
Platonic Troubles No5 0 88% 409 73%
Yes5 1 12%
Loss of Social Standing No5 0 71% 205 86%
Yes5 1 29%
Kicked Out No5 0 64% 211 86%
Yes5 1 36%
Loss of Significance – Trauma and Abuse
Trauma No5 0 52% 200 87%
Yes5 1 48%
Abused as Child No5 0 65% 124 92%
Yes5 1 35%
Abused as Adult No5 0 87% 119 92%
Yes5 1 13%
Radical Social Network
Radical Friend No5 0 3% 708 53%
Legal activity5 1 16%
Nonviolent illegal activity5 2 22%
Extremist violent activity5 3 59%
Radical Family No5 0 42% 301 80%
Legal activity5 1 13%
Nonviolent illegal activity5 2 17%
Extremist violent activity5 3 29%
Radical Significant Other No5 0 45% 325 78%
Legal activity5 1 12%
Nonviolent illegal activity5 2 16%
Extremist violent activity5 3 27%
Control Variables
Age 34.24 (13.30) 1280 14%
Gender Female5 0 10% 1496 0%
Male5 1 90%
Education Less than high school5 0 16% 551 63%
High school5 1 21%
More than high school5 2 63%
Minority status No5 0 72% 1322 12%
Yes5 1 28%
Immigrant No5 0 90% 1364 9%
Yes5 1 10%
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Control variables. We included a wide variety of control variables with possible links to extrem-
ist violence: age, gender, race/ethnic minority status, immigrant status, and education level. We also
added two variables indicating the presence of past activities that frequently include violence (Military
Experience, Previous Criminal Activity).
Results
Analytical Strategy
We present descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations computed on the original dataset. In
the next step, due to the large number of missing values, we used multiple imputation methods to
replace missing data (Allison, 2001; Graham, 2009; Rubin, 1987). We performed logistic regression
pooled across multiple datasets with imputed values to determine which of the predictors were signifi-
cantly related to the use of violence.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and number of nonmissing observations for each of the
variables in the analysis. These results are based only on actual observations before missing values
were imputed. With regard to our outcome variable it can be seen that the majority of individuals in
the dataset (62%) committed a violent act.
Although it is difficult to evaluate the absolute level of significance loss due to a lack of a formal
control group, according to Table 1 indicators of loss of significance in both achievement and social rela-
tionships domains were at low to moderate levels. Twelve percent of the entire sample was unemployed
at the time they were involved in the event for which they were included in the database, and 15% were
unemployed to some extent in the past. A strong majority of the sample (65%) were coded as belonging
to a middle class. However, nearly half of the individuals were coded as having failed to achieve their
aspirations or never attempted to achieve them. With regard to a loss of significance in the domain of
social relationships, 22% of individuals experienced troubles in romantic relationships and 12% experi-
enced platonic troubles. Twenty-nine percent had experienced a loss of social standing, and 36% were
dismissed from a social group or organization. Forty-eight percent of individuals experienced some kind
of a traumatic event in the past, 35% were abused as children, and 13% were abused as adults.
As concerns the composition of the social network, individuals in the sample more often had a
friend engaged in violent extremist activity (59%) than a family member (29%) or a significant other
(27%) that was so engaged.
Finally, with regard to control variables, individuals in the sample were relatively young
(M5 34.24 years) and mostly men (90%). A minority of the sample (28%) comprised racial/ethnic
minorities, and only 10% were immigrants. Most of the individuals (63%) had finished high school.
TABLE 1. Continued
Variable Coding Distribution N % missing values
Military Experience No5 0 81% 877 41%
Yes5 1 19%
Previous Criminal Activity No previous activity5 0 47% 693 55%
Previous (nonviolent) minor activity5 1 24%
Previous (nonviolent) serious activity5 2 12%
Previous violent crime5 3 17%
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One fifth had previous military experience. Almost half of the sample did not have a previous criminal
record, and only 17% had committed a violent crime in the past.
Bivariate Analysis
Table 2 presents the bivariate analyses between predictors and the outcome variable in the
nonimputed dataset. For categorical variables entries in the table are Phi coefficients. For ordinal vari-
ables the entries are tau coefficients. Each bivariate analysis was calculated only on the subset of cases
for which we had nonmissing values for a given variable. Positive and significant coefficients for the
measures of loss of significance indicate support for our hypotheses. We provide a full correlation
matrix in the online supporting information.
Looking first at our four measures of achievement-related loss of significance, we see that all four
are positively and significantly correlated with the occurrence of violent acts. These results suggest
that among ideologically motivated individuals, those who experienced economic failures in their life
were more likely to engage in violent extremism. The next four variables in Table 2 are measures of
loss of significance in the domain of social relationships. In this case, three of the four variables are
positively, and two are significantly related to participation in violent acts. Among ideologically moti-
vated individuals, those who experienced troubles in their romantic or nonromantic relationships were
more likely to turn to violent forms of extremist behavior. By contrast, loss of social standing and being
Table 2. Bivariate Analysis Between Loss of Significance, Radical Social Network, Control Variables, and Violence
Violence
Loss of Significance – Achievement
Employment Situation .12**
Work History .18***
Social Stratum .20***
Aspirationsa .23**
Loss of Significance – Social Relations
Relationship Troubles .16**
Platonic Troubles .19***
Loss of Social Standinga .07
Kicked Outa 2.13
Loss of Significance – Trauma and Abuse
Traumaa .03
Abused as Childa .15
Abused as Adulta .20*
Radical Social Networkb
Radical Friend .30***
Radical Family .20*
Radical Significant Other .38***
Control Variables
Age 2.27***
Gender .02
Education 2.12**
Minority Status .00
Immigrant .01
Military Experience 2.01
Previous Criminal Activity .10**
Note. * p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001
aDue to large number of missing values, we did not impute values for these variables, and they were excluded from the
multivariate analysis.
bEntries for the variables in this group are Phi values. See rationale in the text.
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kicked out of an organization had no significant effect on whether individuals turn to violence. Three
measures of loss of significance associated with trauma or abuse were positive, but only being abused
as an adult was significantly related to the use of violence. In general, the results of the bivariate analysis
were mostly in line with our theoretical expectations. Of 11 measures of loss of significance, all effects
but one were in the expected direction (positive), and seven were statistically significant.
When the variables related to radical social networks were treated as ordinal—under the assump-
tion of a monotonic relation between the degree of radicalization in the social network and the use of
violence—only having a radical friend was significantly associated with the use of violence (s5 .19,
p< . 001). However, when those variables were treated as categorical instead of ordinal, the results
(Phi values) became significant for all three variables, suggesting that the relation between variables
in this group (Radical Social Network) and violence is nonlinear. Closer investigation revealed that
among individuals who did not have any social connections, or had social connections to others who
engaged in violent extremism, the probability of violent actions was higher than the probability of
nonviolent actions. However, individuals with connections to others who were engaged in illegal but
nonviolent activity were less likely to engage in violent than nonviolent actions. We decided to exam-
ine this possibility more closely in the multivariate model by coding the contrasts between the catego-
ries so that we can compare nonviolent and violent illegal activity.
In our set of control variables, age and education were significantly and negatively related to vio-
lent outcomes. Older individuals and those with higher education were less likely to engage in violent
acts. On the other hand, engaging in criminal activity in the past was positively associated with vio-
lence. We found no significant bivariate relations for gender, minority status, immigrant status, or mil-
itary experience.
Limitations and Multiple Imputation
An important constraint of our analyses is the large amount of missing data, especially for the
loss of significance variables (see Table 1). Simply eliminating cases with missing data would greatly
reduce our sample size and make multivariate analysis difficult or impossible; nor is listwise deletion
the recommended solution for handling missing data (Graham, 2009; Jelicic, Phelps, & Lerner, 2009).
To deal with the analytic limitations imposed by missing data, we apply a multiple imputation
procedure (Allison, 2001; Graham, 2009; Rubin, 1987). In this approach, instead of filling in missing
observations with one specific value, multiple datasets with a range of values are created. Each imput-
ed data set is then analyzed separately, and the results of these separate analyses are pooled and aver-
aged to obtain final coefficients. According to Graham, Olchowski, and Gilreath (2007), the optimal
number of created datasets depends on the fraction of missing information. Given that in our dataset
we had a large amount of missing data, we decided to create 25 datasets with imputed values. As we
wanted to use as much information as possible while simultaneously providing valid estimates, we
decided to exclude variables whose percentage of missing values was above 80%. We chose this
threshold, because although still high it allowed us to carry out analyses with several key measures of
loss of significance in the relationship domain. The variables for which missing data were over 80%
and thus were excluded from the multivariate analysis were: Aspirations, Kicked Out, Loss of Social
Standing, Trauma, Abused–Childhood, and Abused–Adulthood. However, following Graham (2009),
we nonetheless included these variables in the imputation models so as to maximize the available
information on each individual case. For the same reason, we included the outcome variable (Vio-
lence) in the imputation models, although we did not impute values for it. In a simulation study
Moons, Donders, Stijnen, and Harrell (2006) showed that imputation of missing predictor values using
the outcome is preferred over imputation without the outcome. Finally, because our variables were
categorical, we rounded the imputed values to preserve the original scales.
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Multivariate Analysis
To verify hypotheses regarding the quest for significance perspective, we next computed two
indices of significance loss, both ranging from 0 to 1. The first index (LoS Achievement)—was com-
puted by averaging across three variables related to loss of significance in an achievement domain
(Employment Situation, Work History, Social Stratum). These variables were moderately correlated
with each other (Employment Situation and Work History: s5 .43, p< .001, Employment Situation
and Social Stratum: s5 .28, p< .001, Work History and Social Stratum: s5 .28, p< .001; mean
Cronbach’s alpha computed across all imputed samples5 0.64). The second index (LoS Social Rela-
tions) was computed by averaging two relationship variables (Relationship Trouble, Platonic Trouble;
s5 .53; p< .001). Because the latter index was computed using two dichotomous variables and could
have only three values, we entered it in the model using two dummy-coded variables. Individuals
with no problems noted either in romantic or platonic relationships were the reference category.
Because of missing values of over 80%, we excluded the remaining measures of loss of significance.
We conducted a hierarchical logistic regression analysis on the multiple datasets with imputed
missing values. The results of these analyses, pooled across all datasets, are presented in Table 3. We
Table 3. Logistic Regression for Violence
Model 1
Loss of Significance
Model 2
Radical Social Network
Model 3
Control Variables
B (SE) Odds Ratio B (SE) Odds Ratio B (SE) Odds Ratio
Constant 20.10 (0.13) .70 (0.30) 1.38 (0.57) 3.95
Loss of Significancea
LoS Achievement 1.46 (0.42) 4.32** 1.40 (0.43) 4.07** 1.04 (0.48) 2.81*
LoS Social Relations (1) 0.36 (0.29) 1.43 0.44 (0.33) 1.56 0.55 (0.32) 1.74†
LoS Social Relations (2) 0.90 (0.36) 2.45* 1.06 (0.42) 2.89* 1.24 (0.43) 3.45*
Radical Social Networkb
Radical Friend (1) 2.31 (0.57) 0.73 20.27 (0.58) 0.77
Radical Friend (2) 2.80 (0.23) 0.45** 20.76 (0.24) 0.47**
Radical Friend (3) 2.86 (0.17) 0.42** 20.82 (0.17) 0.44***
Radical Family (1) .14 (0.41) 1.15 0.20 (0.44) 1.22
Radical Family (2) 2.01 (0.29) 0.99 0.03 (0.31) 1.03
Radical Family (3) 2.11 (0.29) .90 20.07 (0.30) 0.93
Radical Significant Other (1) 2.31 (0.39) .74 20.50 (0.43) 0.61
Radical Significant Other (2) 2.43 (0.31) .65† 20.57 (0.33) 0.57†
Radical Significant Other (3) 2.50 (0.28) .61† 20.57 (0.29) 0.57†
Control variables
Age 20.02 (0.01) 0.98**
Gender 0.40 (0.36) 1.49
Minority Status 20.04 (0.17) 0.96
Immigrant 0.07 (0.26) 1.07
Education (1) 20.20 (0.25) 0.82
Education (2) 20.44 (0.29) 0.64
Military Experience 20.10 (0.22) .91
Criminal Activity (1) 20.08 (0.19) .93
Criminal Activity (2) 0.12 (0.25) 1.13
Criminal Activity (3) 0.27 (0.28) 1.31
Note. † p< .10; * p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001
a LoS Social Relations (1) compares individuals who experienced either platonic or romantic troubles with individuals
who did not experience any relationship troubles. LoS Social Relations (2) compares individuals who experienced both
platonic and romantic troubles with individuals who did not experience any relationship troubles.
b Variables in this group were dummy coded. Variable (1) compares “No connections” to “Violent activity.” Variable (3) com-
pares “Legal activity” to “Violent activity.” Variable (3) compares “Nonviolent illegal activity” to “Violent activity.”
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begin with Model 1 that included only the two indices of loss of significance. In Model 2, we add
measures of radical social networks with dummy codes for radical friends, family members, and sig-
nificant others using a category “Extremist violent activity” as a referent category. In Model 3, we
add demographic control variables and individual’s prior criminal and previous military experiences.
According to Table 3, both loss of significance indices were significant predictors of using vio-
lence. The LoS Achievement index was statistically significant indicating that among ideologically
motivated individuals, those who have experienced an economic loss of significance were more likely
to have engaged in violent extremism. For an individual who experienced loss of significance in the
achievement domain, the odds of a violent versus nonviolent attack were 4.32 times higher than the
odds of a violent attack for an individual who did not experience any loss of significance in this
domain (B5 1.46, SE5 0.42, Exp(B)5 4.32, 95%CI [1.85, 10.09], p5 .001). With regard to the sec-
ond loss of significance index, having troubled relationships was associated with odds of a violent
attack 2.45 higher than the odds of a violent attack among individuals who did not experience troubles
in social relationships (B5 0.90, SE5 0.36, Exp(B)5 2.45, 95%CI [1.19, 5.07], p5 .016).
In Model 2, we added three measures of radical social networks entered as categorical variables.
As can be seen in the second column of the table, compared to the category “Extremist violent
activity,” which served as a referent category, having a friend who was involved in an illegal but
nonviolent activity (B520.86, SE5 0.17, Exp(B)5 0.42, 95%CI [0.30, 0.59], p< .001) as well as
having a friend who was involved in a legal activity (B520.80, SE5 0.23, Exp(B)5 0.45, 95%CI
[0.29, 0.70], p5 .001) was significantly related to the decreased odds of committing a violent attack.
However, the difference between the categories “Extremist violent activity” and “No friend” was not
significant. The pattern of relation between violence and the radicalization of a significant other was
similar to the variable Radical Friend, but it was only marginally significant. The extent of radicaliza-
tion among family members was not significantly related to violence. Adding the measures of radical
social networks to the analysis had no effect on the loss of significance indices, which remained statis-
tically significant.
In Model 3, we added the demographic control variables to the analysis. Controlling for the
demographic variables, our measures of loss of significance remained significant. Among the demo-
graphic variables, only age was significantly related to violence, such that older individuals were less
likely to use violence (B520.02, SE5 0.01, Exp(B)5 0.98, 95%CI [0.97, 0.99], p5 .004). For
every year they aged, individuals were associated with a 2% decrease in the odds of using violence.
We also added two types of activities that may involve violence, past military and criminal experience
(coded as categorical variables). Neither variable was significantly related to our outcome variable nor
did either substantially change the coefficients for our variables of interest.
Given the large number of missing values, we were concerned with estimating the extent to
which our multiple imputation procedure affected the final conclusions. We therefore performed two
additional sets of analyses. First, we analyzed the results under the assumption that all missing values
are in effect indicators of nonpresence by recoding the missing values as “0.” This assumption is fre-
quently made in research using open-source archival data (e.g., Gill et al., 2014; Gruenewald et al.,
2013). After recoding the missing values, we computed the indices of loss of significance, and we per-
formed the multivariate analysis described above. The pattern of results and the significance of our
focal predictors remained identical to the main analysis. The second set of analyses was conducted on
the dataset with imputed values. In these analyses, we limited the number of cases to those for which
we had at least some information about the 11 variables in the loss of significance group. We assumed
that such a subset would constitute a stronger sample as far as the amount of information was con-
cerned. We conducted three analyses, which varied in how restrictive the threshold for inclusion was.
On each subset of cases, we ran the multivariate analyses described above. Again, the pattern and the
significance of results remained the same. We include the details of these analyses and their results in
the online supplementary information.
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Discussion
This article aimed to advance the understanding of violent political extremism by analyzing a
sample of individuals who have committed ideologically motivated crimes in the United States. Our
dataset covered a wide variety of cases, both in terms of individuals’ ideological goals and the means
they employed to pursue those goals. Ideological categories included far left, far right, and Islamic
extremist; crimes ranged from participating in sit-ins and illegal protests to planting bombs in public
buildings. Despite this diversity, our analysis shows that the use of violence can be in part predicted
by a set of conditions that evoke a common psychological state of personal insignificance (Kruglanski
et al., 2014). The data allowed us to investigate in depth two specific threats to individual feelings of
insignificance: economic failure and social detachment. In addition, in a bivariate analysis we ana-
lyzed individuals’ traumatic and abusive experiences as another factor that may elevate the need to
regain significance.
In a sample of nearly 1,500 ideological extremists, we found a pattern of results that largely con-
formed to our predictions: Most of the indicators of loss of significance were positively related to the
probability of political violence. At the bivariate level when individuals experienced failure at work,
when they were rejected in social relationships, or when they were victims of abuse, they were more
likely to resort to violence to pursue their ideological goals. These results are consistent with the quest
for significance theory (Kruglanski et al., 2014), according to which variables that decrease the sense
of personal significance should produce similar effects—that is, they should be related to a higher
probability of using extreme (in this case violent) means.
The present findings also highlight the role of social networks in legitimizing violence (Asal,
Ackerman, & Rethemeyer, 2012; Sageman, 2004). We proposed that the presence of radicalized
others in the individuals’ social milieu should increase their likelihood of using violence. Our results
supported this assumption with respect to friends and to some extent with respect to significant others,
but not with respect to family members. Results that we obtained suggest a more complex, nonlinear
relation between radicalization of the social network and propensity to use violence. Specifically,
compared to those with no connections or with connections to violent extremist friends, those who
had connections to nonviolent friends were less likely to be violent. First, it could be that when a per-
son does not have any social connections such a situation intensifies the feelings of insignificance,
which subsequently increases the appeal of extreme means such as violence. This could explain the
lack of difference in the use of violence between individuals without social connections and individu-
als with violent connections. Second, it is likely that nonviolent social connections serve as a protec-
tive factor, which prevents a person from engaging in violent extreme behavior. It would be useful to
explore these possibilities systematically in future research. The observed difference between friends
and family members’ effects on violent extremism may suggest that people are simply more influ-
enced by their peers than by their family. However, it is also possible that in addition to social influ-
ence, there could also be a self-selection process such that once individuals become interested in an
extremist ideology they search for like-minded people. That in turn could further influence the extent
of radicalization and strengthen a correlation between one’s own radicalization and that of one’s
friends. Note that this mechanism does not apply to family members who are generally ascribed rather
than selected.
To be sure, loss of significance on its own hardly ensures individual engagement in violent
extremism (Kruglanski et al., 2013, 2014). Critical in this regard is the presence of an ideology that
extols violence as a legitimate and effective means for attaining significance. Alternative ideologies
might channel individuals’ loss of significance in prosocial directions. Notably, however, the present
dataset was restricted to ideologically motivated illegal acts. Thus, even though we did not explicitly
assess the extent of individuals’ exposure to violence-supporting narratives, their presence was implic-
it in the acts with which these individuals were associated. Theoretically, it is possible that given a
Quest for Significance and Violent Extremism 13
more diverse sample individual feelings of insignificance would be related to more extreme means,
whether violent or nonviolent. At the same time we suggest that there might be something about vio-
lence that could be especially appealing to individuals searching for significance. Because of their
counternormativity and greater visibility violent actions may signal stronger commitment to a cause
and leave little uncertainty about the intentions of the actors. Due to these properties, violent means
may offer a more direct route to earning significance, which may increase the attractiveness of vio-
lence to individuals searching for clear-cut and unambiguous actions (Webber et al., 2016).
This study is unique in that we used open-source data to examine psychological constructs, espe-
cially those related to threatened self-esteem, expected to affect politically motivated extremist behav-
ior. As noted above, collecting valid data on individuals who radicalize to the point of illegal behavior
poses fundamental challenges. This no doubt explains in part why much of the previous research on
the pathways to extremist violence have been qualitative (Horgan, 2009; Kruglanski et al., 2009;
Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2004). By examining our hypotheses with a large database that includ-
ed instances of real-life political violence, we contributed to the current literature by comparing indi-
viduals with varying radicalization processes. This research also extends the results obtained in
laboratory studies on aggressive behavior, which typically focus on immediate reactions to the frustra-
tion of psychological needs. At the same time, the current study based on open-source data has clear
limitations. Radical extremists are a difficult group to study with conventional social science methods
like experiments or surveys. In response, many researchers rely on open-source documents such as
newspaper accounts and court records to reconstruct the life histories of terrorist perpetrators (Freilich,
Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014; Gill et al., 2014; LaFree & Dugan, 2007). While we
have sought to be rigorous both in our data-collection and analysis methods, it is important to note
that the data were collected retrospectively and although we used procedures to improve the reliability
of the coding, the process by definition includes some level of subjectivity.
Moreover, because our data are not based on experiments or surveys, we needed to use proxy var-
iables such as unemployment, low social status, and social rejection to measure key theoretical con-
structs related to the loss of significance. Although our findings are generally consistent with recent
laboratory experiments (Webber et al., 2016), our nonexperimental design and lack of measures of
mediating mechanisms is open to alternative explanations. Thus, it could be argued that the set of con-
ditions included in our study, instead of increasing the motivation to prove one’s significance, may
simply decrease the motivation to conform to mainstream norms that forbid the use of violence.
Although some studies demonstrated that social rejection may indeed increase impulsivity and reduce
self-control (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005), we believe that it is unlikely that this
mechanism explains violence found in the current sample. Violent behavior in our sample was in
most cases neither impulsive nor low-cost; rather, it usually demanded a substantial investment of
resources from the actors. At the very least the extremist behavior undertaken by the individuals in
our sample generally had profound effects on the lives of the perpetrators. It seems likely that instead
of indicating low motivation to follow normative paths, it was instead high motivation to pursue a
cause which drove the counter normative behavior for the individuals we studied.
Finally, although most of the findings were in line with our predictions, we should acknowledge
one unexpected result. The variable indicating whether an individual was excluded from social groups
and organizations turned out to be negative at the bivariate level. The predicted positive relationship
between social exclusion and violence assumes that exclusion induced a feeling of insignificance.
However, being expelled from an organization or group may deprive the individual of access to such
powerful drivers of violent extremism as political ideology and social validation of violent means.
Although admittedly a post hoc explanation, this account is consistent with a major premise of the
quest for significance theory whereby motivation is only one component of violent extremism, which
requires the additional presence of a salient ideological narrative and a compelling social network
presence that supports aggression (Kruglanski et al., 2014).
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Another limitation stems from the fact that due to the large amount of missing data we were
unable to include a set of predictors related to trauma and abuse in our final model. Although we
showed that two distinct sources of insignificance in the domains of achievement and social relations
were independent predictors of violence future studies should investigate other life events that can
evoke general feelings of significance. For instance, a recent article has shown that cultural marginali-
zation and discrimination against the ingroup contributed to the feelings of insignificance among
immigrants, which subsequently was related to greater support for radical views (Lyons-Padilla,
Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq, & van Egmond, 2016).
In sum, the present dataset offered a unique opportunity to test hypotheses drawn from quest for
significance theory in the context of real-world instances of political violence. While by no means the
only predictor of participation in violent extremism, the loss of significance perspective may provide
insights into ways of reducing the risk that individuals will engage in this form of violent behavior.
Given the threat of homegrown terrorist attacks around the world, understanding the emergence and
persistence of politically motivated violence presents a particularly important issue for both research-
ers and policymakers.
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